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Review

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old, because eternal (pp. 4-6). "False" originals confuse all terminology by changing perennial usage. They use the tactics of propaganda, figures of speech, a false reason, ambiguous phrases, appeals to science; they are motivated by pride; they deify their own ideas; they surround themselves by sycophants (pp. 14-20); they undermine the established order (p. 25), etc. They are subjectivists. But since the term "subjectivist" is applied to Bacon, Descartes, Comte, Husserl, moral relativists, and even to cosmological schools differing from hylomorphism (pp. 240, 344), the common meaning which this term has here must be "differing from traditionalism." Hence, the author's distinctive argument reduces to one which is both circular and unproductive of agreement: traditional philosophy is true, because, when tested by traditional philosophy, nontraditional philosophies are false. Those who disregard it or advance arguments against it can do so only at the cost of being termed false originals or subjectivists. After all, it was not the purpose of the volume to plead for, or to record, a return to classical logic, but to induce "beneficial correction, and for this reason its subject is Immortal Philosophy...not merely as object of meditation... [but] in operation against fallacious systems" (p. 56).

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GEORGE SYLVESTER MORRIS. *His Philosophical Career and Theistic Idealism*. By MARC EDMUND JONES. Philadelphia, Donald McKay Co., 1948. Pp. xvi, 430.

George Sylvester Morris is the translator of Überweg's great history, Dewey's teacher at Johns Hopkins, a theistic idealist, and author of books on British philosophy, Kant, Hegel, and Christianity. Morris holds an established, if relatively minor, place in the history of American philosophy.

Mr. Jones recognizes his indebtedness to R. M. Wenley's *The Life and Work of George Sylvester Morris* (1917) and admits that he has discovered no new source material unknown to Wenley. But Jones criticizes Wenley for a somewhat subjective and arbitrary account of Morris' thought, which reads in certain pet preconceptions of Wenley's rather than letting Morris speak for himself. For this reason and because of the relative neglect into which Morris has fallen in recent years, Jones deems himself justified in his fresh attempt.

The present work, like Wenley's, is sympathetic with Morris' main theses. It renders the facts about Morris which Wenley had discovered available to the present generation of students. It reprints Morris' article on Trendelenburg from *The New Englander* (1874) and prints a previously unpublished draft of an introduction to Hegel's *Philosophy of the State and History*.

While Jones is less arbitrary than Wenley in interpreting Morris, he sticks so close to the letter that the spirit of Morris' basic argument for idealism fails to stand out in a clear logical structure. Nor is his relation to other American idealists sufficiently considered. As a biography the book is valuable. There is a complete bibliography. On p. 240 the umlaut is missing from "Tübingen."

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KNOWING AND THE KNOWN. By JOHN DEWEY and ARTHUR J. BENTLEY. Boston, Beacon Press, 1949. Pp. xiv, 334. \$4.00.

The purpose of this book is announced as "the attempt to fix a set of leading words capable of firm use in the discussion of 'knowings' and 'existings' in that specialized region of research called the theory of knowledge" (p. xi).

The method consists largely in the collocation (usually with disapproving comment) of extracts from the writings of Carnap, Morris Cohen, Russell, Quine, and many others. This is said to yield "a startling diagnosis of linguistic disease not only in the general epistemological field, where everyone would anticipate it, but also in the specialized logical field, which ought to be reasonably immune" (p. xii). The chief fault with which these writers are charged is that of vicious abstraction—a refusal to understand "that knowings are always and everywhere inseparable from the knowns—that the two are twin aspects of common fact" (p. 53).

The fruits of the recommended method (the "transactional approach") are displayed in a penultimate chapter entitled "A Trial Group of Names." The list includes the following items:

Knowings: Organic phases of transactionally observed behaviors. Here considered in the familiar central range of namings-knowings. The correlated organic aspects of signalings and symbolings are in need of transactional systematization with respect to namings-knowings.

Knowns: Environmental phases of transactionally observed behaviors. In the case of namings-knowings the range of the knowns is that of existence within fact or cosmos, not in a limitation to the recognized affirmations of the moment, but in process of advance in long durations.

"Organic" does not occur in the list, but for "organism" we are given:

Organism: Taken as transactionally existent in cosmos. Presentations of it in detachment or quasi-detachment are to be viewed as tentative or partial.

And for "environmental" we turn to:

Environment: Situations, events, or objects in connection (*q.v.*) with organism as object. Subject to inquiry physically, physiologically, and, in full transactional treatment, behaviorally.